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Abstract 
The perception of systemic risk in the banking sector deeply changed from the autumn of 2007 onwards. In a context of 
increasing risk awareness, after a long period of “blind trust” in the virtues and soundness of the financial system, Lehman 
Brothers’ default, announced on 15 September 2008, represented a major breakdown. Such an exception to the deeply 
trusted “too big to fail” principle – beyond generating a severe turbulence in the financial markets and stimulating far-
reaching analysis on the weaknesses of regulatory schemes – left a durable scar on banking risk perception. The process of 
normalization which was slowly taking place during the year 2010 and the first months of 2011 quickly stopped and 
reversed its direction with the explosion of sovereign debt crisis in Europe, showing its intrinsic fragility. Towards the end 
of 2011, from many points of views, the financial markets were neighboring the extremes registered in the autumn of 2008.  
What we argue in this paper is that a lasting change in the traditional equilibriums and functioning of the financial system 
took place in Europe. This change calls for a re-thinking in banking and liquidity management, in pricing models and in 
monetary policy strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims at analyzing how banking risk perception increased after Lehman’s default. Our focus is on 
the wholesale money markets and on interbank relationships. From many points of view a slow change was 
already observable before the dramatic collapse of the American investment bank. The shock generated by 
Lehman’s default exacerbated the phenomenon and made it durable. 
Our analysis will take into consideration various indicators and markets which cross confirm a relevant 
increase in fear, mistrust and systemic risk concerns inside the European banking community. This 
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phenomenon is the most scaring side of the current financial turbulence, since banks cannot function properly 
without appropriate funding and liquidity. As funding and liquidity management capacity ground their roots in 
trust, a severe credit crunch is more than likely if trust is not quickly restored. 
 
2. The interbank money market 
The heightened banking risk perception is first and foremost a problem inside the banking community and 
affects the interbank market for liquidity. Banks do not trust each other anymore or, at least, they do not trust 
each other as they used to do. The phenomenon can be observed in many ways (Angelini et al. 2009, Cassola 
and Morana 2012).  
Figure 1 shows two interbank reference rates, both diffused by the European Banking Federation (EBF): the 
12-months Euribor and the 12-months Eurepo. Euribor represents the offer rate which would be quoted to a 
prime bank for an unsecured 12-month deposit. Eurepo represents the offer rate which would be quoted to a 
prime bank for a 12-month repurchase agreement and, thus, for a secured deposit. Both rates are calculated 
daily at 11 a.m. by making an average of the rates declared by a panel of European banks. The spread between 
Euribor and Eurepo can be read as a measure of the value attached to the collateral by the lenders. As the 
collateral represents a credit risk mitigation device, its value is a function of the borrower’s default probability. 
Before the sub-prime crisis the spread Euribor – Eurepo was minimal and most often negative. As prime banks 
in Europe were perceived almost risk-free, the value attached to the collateral was negligible and the 
administrative burden of collateral management made repurchase agreements less attractive than unsecured 
lending among prime banks. Thus the rate applied to an unsecured deposits (Euribor) was very close or even 
slightly lower than the rate applied to secured deposits. With the burst of the sub-prime crisis and, in particular, 
after Lehman Brothers’ default the spread increased significantly. Since both Euribor and Eurepo are 
hypothetical rates applied to a prime banking counterpart, the increase in the spread can be read as an evidence 
of the heightened systemic risk perception. In simpler words, the meaning of the spread is the following: no 
bank – even a high-standing bank – is safe and thus the rate applied to an unsecured lending has to incorporate 
a credit risk premium. Figure 1 shows that – after the peak reached in the days immediately following 
Lehman’s default – the spread never really “normalized”. The gradual reduction which was in place, quickly 
reversed when the sovereign debt crisis worsened in Europe, proving that the ghost of banking fragility was 
still there.  
 
Fig. 1. 12-month Euribor vs. 12-month Eurepo. Daily data. Source: European Banking Federation.  
 
The growing risk premium incorporated into the Euribor has far reaching consequences for the banks and 
for their clients. In fact the Euribor has been and still is the most common parameter used per financial 
indexing. Thus trillions of floating rate assets and liabilities are anchored to an interest rate which used to be 
risk free and that is not risk free any more. Many derivatives as well are linked to the Euribor, like the interest 
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rate swaps for instance. As a consequence the interest margin of banks have been affected by unexpected 
positive or negative fluctuations – according to the sign of their maturity gap – due to systemic risk concerns 
and to their impact on unsecured lending cost.  
 
In figure 2 the spread between 12-month Euribor and 12-month Eurepo rate has been translated into a 1-
year probability of default. In the calculation the Eurepo rate is assumed risk-free, the lender is considered risk 
neutral and the recovery rate in case of default is assumed to be 30 per cent.  
Thus we impose: 
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where: 
i = risk-free rate, equal to the Eurepo rate; 
r = Euribor; 
RR= recovery rate; 
PD = 12-month implied probability of default. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the default probability of a prime bank – which used to be zero – has raised 
substantially since the autumn of 2007 reaching a record 2,88% soon after Lehman’s default. The default 
probability has never come back to zero since then and is moving towards a new peak towards the end of 2011. 
 
 
 Fig. 2. 12-month implied probability of default implicit in the Euribor-Ois spread. Personal elaboration on data from Bloomberg. 
 
Another clear sign of the lack of trust inside the banking community in Europe is the marginal deposit 
facility’s rate of usage at the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB accepts unlimited quantities of 
overnight deposits from banks resident in the euro area, paying a below-market rate. Traditionally, the facility 
has been used by European banks for very limited quantities, just as the term “marginal” would suggest. 
Looking at figure 3 we can observe an abnormally high usage starting soon after Lehman default. The 
phenomenon is in part a by-product of the non-standard monetary measures taken by the European Central 
Bank which increased the liquidity in the market. However the extent of marginal deposit facility’s usage is 
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clearly related to systemic risk concerns in the banking community. In other words: banks prefer to park their 
liquidity at the central bank, suffering an opportunity cost, instead of lending it to other financial institutions. 
Looking at the usage’s path, we can clearly observe a peak soon after Lehman’s default (when the 
phenomenon started and the facility’s usage became distinguishable from zero) and another even higher peak 
at the end of 2011 i.e. in the eye of the sovereign debt crisis’ tornado.   
The intensive usage of the marginal deposit facility calls for a change in the strategies of the ECB. The 
central bank has to consider that a relevant part of the extraordinary refinancing granted in times of lacking 
liquidity just comes back to its own books without alleviating the market’s aridity (Brunetti et al., 2011).   
 
Fig. 3. Marginal deposit facility usage at the European Central Bank. Daily data in mln. Euro. Source: Bloomberg. 
 
3. The covered interest parity  
Another notable sign of the on-going turbulence in the interbank market is related to the repeated deviations 
from the covered interest parity in the foreign exchange markets (Baba and Packer, 2009). The equilibrium 
forward exchange rate between two currencies is a function of three factors: the spot exchange rate and the 
interest rate level in both currencies. Deviations from the equilibrium open opportunities for arbitrage, based 
on contemporaneous: lending in one currency + investing in the other + covering of the foreign exchange risk 
through a forward transaction. If there is sufficient distance from the equilibrium, the described combination 
produces a profit that is free from market risk, but exposed to credit risk on the investing leg and on the 
forward exchange transaction.  
 
Normally, arbitrage opportunities are short lived and are mainly exploited by banks and other financial 
institutions on the wholesale market. In times when the credit risk at interbank level is considered negligible, 
even a tiny profit margin represents a sufficient basis for an arbitrage and the forward exchange rates remains 
close to its equilibrium level. When the credit risk is not perceived as negligible, the profit margin has to 
incorporate an adequate premium for credit risk for the arbitrage to be attractive. Thus, many arbitrage 
opportunities remain unexploited, especially if the heightened risk perception does not concern individual 
institutions, but is systemic.  
Figure 4 shows a pattern similar to those commented in the previous paragraph. We have computed the 
profit in Euro obtainable by either: 
• Investing 100 million euro + Funding the investment through a Us dollar loan + Hedging foreign 
exchange risk through a forward purchase of the Us dollars needed to pay back the funding; 
• Raise a funding of 100 million Euro + Investing the counter value in Us dollar + Hedging the foreign 
exchange risk through a forward sale of the Us dollars to be cashed at the end of the investment. 
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In figure 4 we have reported zero when neither of the described operation could produce a profit (i.e. when 
there was no arbitrage opportunity). Instead we have reported the amount of the market risk-free arbitrage 
profit in Euro obtainable through either of the two combinations. 
Before the autumn of 2007 few unexploited arbitrage opportunities emerged, when the calculation was 
performed at the closing interest and foreign exchange rates. From the autumn of 2007 onwards, it is quite 
clear that a certain credit risk compensation is required for the arbitrage to be attractive and thus exploited. The 
credit risk compensation shows a peak after Lehman’s default. After the shock, a relative normalisation is 
observable, even if the pre-2007 level is not restored. A relevant increase in the unexploited arbitrage profit 
and thus in the interbank credit risk premium is in place during the autumn of 2011, as a consequence of the 
sovereign debt crisis.  
Since the covered interest parity is not holding any more, the equilibrium forward rate cannot be considered 
as a solid point of reference and a value where the market price would rapidly converge to. Thus, pricing 
models should be adjusted by considered a wider fluctuation of the forward market rate relatively to the 
theoretical equilibrium. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Theoretical arbitrage profit on 100 mln. Euro, calculated at closing interest and foreign exchange rate. Personal elaboration on data 
from Bloomberg. 
 
4. The equity and CDS market  
The heightened banking risk perception and the growing concerns for systemic stability had an important 
impact on equity market as well. If the banks are not trusting each as they used to do, why should investors 
trust them? In table 1 we can observe the poorer performance of the sectorial index Eurostoxx Banks compared 
to the blue chips index Eurostoxx 50. The negative performance is particularly acute starting from the autumn 
of 2008 and is accompanied by an increasing correlation of the index components. These increasing correlation 
can be read as a consequence of a common factor i.e. the worsened systemic risk perception which affects all 
banks, even if individually sound.   
In figure 5 we can also observe a relevant increase in price volatility. Before the autumn of 2007 the moving 
daily standard deviation of the Eurostoxx Banks index was in line with the standard deviation of the Eurostoxx 
50 index and even slightly lower. Since September 2007 the sectorial index has become much more volatile 
than the broad composition index. 
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TABLE 1. : Eurostoxx Banks Index – Perfomance and individual components correlation. 
 
Eurostoxx Banks – 
Individual components 
average correlation 
Eurostoxx Banks   
% variation 
Eurostoxx 50 
 % variation 
2000 - 
2011 0,4439 
-71,80% -55,56% 
1/9/08 – 
31/12/11  0,5145 
-64,82% -32,83% 
Year 2011  0,5477 
-39,70% -20,42% 
2000 –
2002 0,2909 
-50,79% -36,98% 
Source: Personal elaboration on data from Bloomberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Moving 90-day standard deviation of the Eurostoxx 50 and Eurostoxx Banks index. Personal elaboration on data from Bloomberg.  
 
 
The heightened banking risk perception can also be assessed by looking at credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads. Figure 6 shows the relevant increase in CDS spread on European financials from 2007 onwards. From 
the autumn of 2007 to the first half of 2010, the increase was in line with the trend shown by the broad 
composition CDS index on European corporates. In the second half of 2010 and, even more, in 2011, the risk 
perception on European financial institutions worsened and, consequently, the premium on default insurances 
rose dramatically, reaching an average level of 300 basis points in November 2011. The phenomenon is mainly 
to be ascribed to the sovereign debt crisis. Figure 7 shows a significant increase in the correlation between 
CDS on European financials and CDS on European sovereign entities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6:  Credit default swap index: European financials and European corporates.  Source: Bloomberg.  
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Fig. 7:  Moving 90-day correlation between Markit CDS Index on European Financials and the average level of premium required on a 
sample of euro area countries. The sample includes: Germany, France, Ireland, Belgium, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland, Italy, Greece. The 13 countries are equally weighted in the average. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Starting from the autumn of 2007 the world changed for banks in Europe. Some traditional equilibriums 
were altered, mistrust and asymmetric information impaired the smooth functioning of interbank and wholesale 
markets, depositors became nervous and ready to withdraw their liquidity. The default of Lehman Brothers 
skyrocketed the phenomena and affected in a durable way the perception of banking credit risk. 
In a market which was slowly “normalising” the burst of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe interrupted and 
quickly reversed a process which was fragile. The liquidity management for European banks was made even 
more difficult by the sudden transformation of assets which were considered almost risk free and readily 
negotiable into “problematic assets”, burdened by a relevant potential capital loss. This was for instance the 
case with the Italian Btp or the Spanish Bonos.  
One of the most striking evidence of the changing risk perception in banking is the spread between the 
interest rates applied on unsecured versus secured lending in the interbank market. Since the unsecured 
reference rate (Euribor) is the most diffused parameter for financial indexing, the impact of the increasing 
credit risk premium is not negligible both on the interest margin of banks and on the funding costs of 
borrowers.  
A further analysis of this spread shows that the implied 1-year probability of default for a prime bank – 
which used to be zero – remained above 1% ever since the autumn of 2007, reaching two peaks well above 2% 
after Lehman Brothers and at the end of 2011 as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.  
The turmoil touched the foreign exchange market as well. Significant deviations from the covered interest 
parity on the Usd/Euro rate are observable from the autumn of 2007 onwards.  
 
What are the consequences of the described phenomena? The change in the functioning of the wholesale 
and interbank markets calls for a new approach to banking. Bank cannot rely any more of the channels for 
liquidity management they have been using in the last two decades. In a certain sense a “back to past” process 
is needed. Banks should reduce their dependence from interbank markets which have become fragile, volatile 
and relatively expensive. Traditional retail funding should be revitalised.  
Furthermore the pricing models and the indexing methods should be revised. A spread over Euribor as a 
measure of credit risk premium doesn’t make sense any more. Since unsecured lending in interbank markets is 
basically dead, new parameters should be taken into consideration when pricing a loan or a derivative or to 
index a floating rate instrument.  
Finally, central banks should appropriately take into consideration the new behaviour of banks and the 
credit risk concerns inside the banking community. An increase in refinancing will not automatically translate 
into an increase in funding available at interbank level. New instruments are needed to help the smooth 
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circulation of liquidity among banks and thus an effective cash flow management. Maybe a form of central 
bank guarantee could be more useful than traditional refinancing, provided moral hazard issues are kept under 
control.   
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